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Abstract
I estimate the extent to which modications of privately securitized
mortgages increased or forgave debt during the Great Recession and aftermath, from 2008-2014. I nd that loan modications weakened household balance sheets by adding $20 billion to household debt, with the net
amount of debt added per modication doubling from 2010-2014. I also
nd that the increase in debt is consistent with capitalization of fees, but
not missed interest payments. Capitalization of fees is signicant because
it has been associated with a principal-agent problem between investors
and mortgage servicers preventing ecient loss mitigation, as well as consumer nancial protection abuses.

1

Introduction

A major factor contributing to the Great Recession and its aftermath in the
U.S., from 2008-2014, was instability in the household mortgage market. Following historic declines in house prices, the default rate on household mortgages

1 These

increased from the historical average of 2% to a high of 11% in 2010.

defaults were particularly concentrated in mortgages that were privately securitized, and resulted in waves of foreclosures that were highly costly to borrowers
who lost their homes, investors in securities or derivatives based on these loans,
and the communities in which the foreclosures occurred.

Loan modications

which forgive debt in delinquent mortgages were widely discussed as a tool
for mitigating losses for investors by preventing costly foreclosures, as well as
∗ Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Loyola Marmount University. Email:
thomas.herndon@lmu.edu. This paper has greatly benetted from feedback from Robert
Pollin, Michael Ash, Arindrajit Dube, Gerald Epstein, Jennifer Taub, and Alan White. All
errors are of course my own. Original version of paper: August 15th, 2016.
1 Data on the delinquency rate for U.S. household mortgages is available from
the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database. Accessed June 15th, 2016 from:
http://research.stlouisfed.org/
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providing economic stimulus by deleveraging borrowers.

However, delinquent

mortgages can also be modied to increase debt through capitalizing either
missed interest payments or fees.

Increasing debt reduces the eectiveness of

modications at loss mitigation and providing stimulus.
The analysis in this paper has two related goals. First, I estimate the extent to which voluntary modication of privately securitized mortgages either
increased or forgave debt during the period 2008-2014. I focus on loans used
as collateral for mortgage-backed private label securities (PLS), because this is
where the largest portion of subprime loans were securitized, and hence where
the largest portion of defaults occurred. I account for the increase or decrease in
debt from modications using a loan-level panel data set which covers roughly
30%-40% of the PLS market, depending on year.

Second, I analyze whether

capitalization in loan modications is driven by missed interest payments or
fees.

Missed interest payments are observed in my data, while fees assessed

by servicers are not.

This allows me to use a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition

to estimate the portion of increase in capitalization that can be explained by
missed interest payments or other observables, and the portion that cannot be
explained by observables, which is consistent with fees. My decomposition analysis uses the fact that the primary portion of the Home Aordable Modication
Program (HAMP) expired in 2012 to create a benchmark for measuring capitalization of fees. The HAMP program required the capitalization of missed interest payments, but prohibited capitalization of fees. Therefore, capitalization
in pre-2012 modications provides a counterfactual for measuring the portion of
capitalization in post-2012 modications due to missed interest payments, but
not fees.
There are two primary ndings in this paper. First, loan modications in the
PLS market weakened household balance sheets during the Great Recession and
foreclosure crisis, resulting in a total net increase to borrower unpaid principal
balances of $20 billion. Modications increased debt for all years in my sample,
with only 5% of modications resulting in net reductions of debt. I also nd that
capitalization increased during the later years of my sample. The net amount
of debt added per modication doubled from 2010-2014, increasing from 5.6%
to 11.3% of the original balance.
My second main nding is that the increase in capitalization in later years is
not consistent with capitalization of missed interest payments, because missed
interest payments were

declining

as capitalization was increasing. I conrm this

nding with my decomposition analysis, which shows that missed interest payments have little explanatory power. In contrast, my results are consistent with
capitalization of fees because the unobserved component accounts for between
two-thirds to three-quarters of the increase in capitalization. Additionally, the
increase is consistent with capitalization of fees because I nd substantial heterogeneity among servicers in the dierence between missed interest payments
and capitalization. Substantial heterogeneity among servicers suggests that differences in capitalization amounts reect dierences in servicer characteristics,
such as the propensity to capitalize fees, rather than systematic dierences in
characteristics of modied loans, such as missed interest payments.
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The nding that loan modications weakened household balance sheets is
relevant for research on the role of household debt during the Great Recession.
This literature has argued that a key determinant of the large declines in spending during the Great Recession was the distribution of losses from the housing
bubble between debtor and creditor. Concentrating losses on borrowers, as is
specied in debt contracts, would cause larger declines in spending than a more
equal distribution of losses, because borrowers generally have far less nancial
capacity for absorbing losses than lenders. This literature has argued for the
use of debt forgiveness to repair household balance sheets, thus preventing the
large declines in spending (Mian and Su, 2014; Farhi and Werning, 2016).
Prior research in this literature has shown that early modications in the PLS
market tended to increase debt, rather than forgive it.

For example, White

(2008) found that the average modication in privately securitized mortgages in
November 2008 increased debt by roughly 5%. In addition, a 2010 study by the
Congressional Oversight Panel (COP, 2010) found that 95% of modications
occurring through the HAMP program increased debt by 5%. An advantage of
my data relative to these prior studies is that it allows me to calculate the entire
net increase in debt in the PLS market over a much longer time period, which
includes the entire Great Recession and foreclosure crisis. My ndings extend
the previous results by showing that the net increase in debt added per modication doubled from 2010-2014, and that modications increased household
debt by $20 billion over the period 2008-2014. To be sure, 75% of modications
in my sample did reduce borrower monthly payments, and so provided some
relief even if increasing debt. However, the increase in debt blunted the ability
of modications to mitigate losses or provide economic stimulus by increasing
negative equity (Mian and Su, 2014; Haughwout, Sutherland and Tracy, 2013;
Haughwout, Okah and Tracy, 2016).
The nding that the increase in capitalization in later years is consistent
with fees is relevant for the recent literature on frictions in private mortgage
securitization that prevented ecient loss mitigation.

Several papers in this

literature have argued that a signicant cause of the failure of loss mitigation
in this market was a principal agent-problem between mortgage servicers, who
are responsible for processing payments and managing defaults, and investors
in securities based on these loans (Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011;
COP, 2009). Once a loan enters default, the compensation structure for mortgage servicers contains perverse incentives to increase the costliness of default,
rather than mitigate losses for investors. Servicers are able to receive income
from a diverse array of fees for delinquent loans, including but not limited to late
fees, title search fees, property maintenance fees, appraisal fees, and other fees
related to the foreclosure. These fees create a principal-agent problem between
investors and servicers because they incentivize foreclosure over modication
even when modication is in the investors' interest, increase the chance of redefault when they are capitalized in modications, and can be recovered through
the proceeds of foreclosure sales prior to investors receiving any revenue. Reports state that the ability to arbitrarily assess these fees eectively creates a
cost-plus contract arrangement with no oversight of either the costs or the plus
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components, COP (2009).
The lack of loss mitigation due to the principal-agent problem is also signicant for literature on consumer nancial protection (Campbell et al., 2011),
because foreclosing instead of modifying and capitalization of fees have been
associated with substantial abuses.

For example, one of the largest recent

Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) enforcement actions levied a
$2 billion ne against one of the largest mortgage servicers, Ocwen.

Among

other violations, Ocwen charged unauthorized fees for default related services,
deceived consumers about foreclosure alternatives and improperly denied loan
modications, and engaged in illegal foreclosure practices.

2 Previous reports

and CFPB actions have documented the existence of these perverse incentives,
and contain case studies of individual servicers who have acted on these incentives.

However, this research has not yet documented how systematic or

widespread this problem was in the PLS market. My ndings extend this literature by using a comprehensive loan-level data set to provide systematic evidence
that the increase in debt is consistent with capitalization of fees, but not consistent with capitalization of missed interest payments.
The literature on frictions and loss mitigation has also argued that losses
from foreclosure averaging over 50% of the original loan balance suggest that
there was room to increase debt forgiveness to mitigate losses (Cordell et al.,
2008; White, 2008).

My ndings are consistent with this research, and show

that foreclosures occurred almost twice as frequently as modications, with
losses ranging from 45%-65% of the original balance.

Additionally, my data

also allow me to assess the full scale of loss through calculating total losses from
foreclosure for the entire PLS market during this period. I nd that losses from
foreclosure totaled almost $600 billion from 2008-2014. In contrast, the gross
amount of forgiveness totaled only $14.2 billion. Consistent with prior ndings,
the large dierence between total losses and forgiveness at the market level
strongly suggests that forgiveness could have been increased to mitigate losses.
The tragedy of loss mitigation was that punishing borrowers by increasing debt,
rather than forgiving it, also resulted in the unnecessary destruction of wealth
for investors and the communities in which these foreclosures occurred.

2

Background Information

2.1 Debt Forgiveness and Stimulus
Following the historic declines in house prices that began in 2006, households
signicantly reduced spending to repair their balance sheets. The literature on
household balance sheets has argued that a key determinant of the large declines
in spending during the Great Recession was the distribution of losses from the

2A
description
of
the
consent
order
can
be
found
at:
https://www.consumernance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-state-authorities-order-ocwento-provide-2-billion-in-relief-to-homeowners-for-servicing-wrongs/. Accessed September 1,
2017.
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housing bubble between debtor and creditor.

Debt contracts are inherently

distributional because they specify that the debtor take rst losses from any
decline in home prices. However, concentrating losses on borrowers also causes
larger declines in spending than a more equal distribution of losses, because
debtors generally have far less nancial capacity for absorbing losses than lenders
(Mian and Su, 2014; Farhi and Werning, 2016).
The literature on household balance sheets has widely discussed using loan
modications that forgive debt in delinquent mortgages as a tool to directly provide economic stimulus (Mian and Su, 2014; Liu and Rosenberg, 2013; Boyce
et al., 2012; Bair, 2007). Debt forgiveness prevents the large declines in spending
by restoring borrower net worth, without requiring large reductions in spending.
In formal models that incorporate nancial fragility mechanisms, standard policies for ghting nancial fragility can be interpreted as transfers that maintain
or increase borrower net worth, (Bernanke and Gertler, 1990). Additionally,
there are several successful historical examples of household debt restructuring
programs, such as the U.S. during the Great Depression, or Iceland during the
2008 crisis. Based on analysis of these historical case-studies, the IMF argued
that, bold and well-designed household debt restructuring programs, could
substantially mitigate the negative eects of household deleveraging on economic activity at relatively low scal cost (Liu and Rosenberg, 2013).
In addition to the stimulus provided through directly deleveraging individual borrowers, debt forgiveness can provide additional benets by preventing
foreclosures, which have signicant negative externalities that lower prices for
all homes in the neighborhood.

Mian, Su and Trebbi (2015) estimate that

the causal eects of foreclosures can account for roughly one-third of the total
decline in home values from 2007-2009. They also estimate that the destruction of wealth from these foreclosures lowered aggregate demand, accounting for
one-fth in the reduction of residential investment and auto sales during this
period.
Two earlier studies, White (2008) and COP (2010), have also shown that
when modications did occur, they tended to increase debt rather than forgive
it. White (2008) found that 68% of PLS modications which occurred during
November 2008 increased the borrower's principal balance by capitalizing unpaid interest and fees, and that less than half reduced monthly payments. The
average amount capitalized was $10,800 on a balance of $216,000, or 5%. In contrast, only 10% of these modications included principal reduction. The COP
(2010) study focused on HAMP modications, and also showed that they increased borrower debt. However, this was largely due to program design. While
the HAMP program prohibited the capitalization of delinquency fees, the program also mandated capitalization of missed interest payments.

The HAMP

program then reduced borrower monthly payments through a combination of
interest rate reductions and term extensions. Overall, COP (2010) showed that
95% of HAMP modications increased borrower negative equity by roughly 5%.
Re-default rates were also quite high. For some of the early vintages of HAMP
modications, close to 50% re-defaulted within the rst year (COP, 2010, 2009).
The previous studies of White (2008) and COP (2010) that documented
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capitalization are the closest studies in this literature to the analysis in this
paper. My study extends the previous ndings by covering a much longer time
period, and calculating the increase in debt at the level of the entire the PLS
market, rather than at the loan-level. For example, White (2008) uses loan-level
modication data to reports the average amount capitalized for modications
occurring in November 2008. My study uses the same source of data, but collects data for every modication that occurred from 2008-2014. This period is
of particular historical interest because it covers the entire Great Recession and
foreclosure crisis, in a market that contained the bulk of mortgage failures. My
study also extends this research by showing that the problems previously identied grew through time, with the net amount of debt added per modication
doubling from 2010-2014.
To be sure, 75% of modications in my sample did reduce borrower monthly
payments, and so provided some relief even if increasing debt. However, through
increasing negative equity, capitalization signicantly reduced the ability of
modications to provide economic stimulus through several mechanisms. First,
increasing negative equity did not reduce the need for substantial cuts in borrower spending to deleverage and rebuild lost savings.

Negative equity also

reduced the eectiveness of monetary policy because it prevented the borrower
from gaining access to external nance, such as renancing at lower interest
rates (Mian and Su, 2014).

Negative equity also reduced aggregate demand

by reducing the incentive to invest in the household, because all gains would go
to the lender. Haughwout, Sutherland and Tracy (2013) nd that from 20072012, households with negative equity decreased residential investment by 75%.
Finally, modications with capitalization had a signicantly higher re-default
rate than modications that reduced debt (Haughwout, Okah and Tracy, 2016).
Moreover, increasing negative equity, rather than eliminating it through debt
forgiveness, guaranteed that re-defaults would result in costly foreclosure because the borrower could not sell the home without paying the lender the difference between the amount owed and the sale price.

These foreclosures had

substantial negative externalities for the communities in which they occurred.
Foreclosures reduced house prices for all homes in the community, thus further
depressing aggregate demand.

Mian, Su and Trebbi (2015) found that the

causal eects of foreclosures could account for roughly one-third of the decline
in house prices, one-fth of the decline in residential investment, and one-fth
of the decline in auto sales from 2007-2009.

2.2 Debt Forgiveness, Loss Mitigation, and Consumer Financial Protection
In many cases, loan modications which reduce debt can also be in the lender's
interest because they avoid the high costs associated with foreclosure (Maturana, 2017; Mian and Su, 2014; Moore and Remy, 2013; Posner and Zingales,
2009). Houses sold in foreclosure typically sell at a steep discounts, averaging
roughly 27% of the home price, for two main reasons. First, housing is a classic
example of an illiquid asset, but nancial institutions typically have an incentive
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to sell a home as rapidly as possible once it enters foreclosure. Therefore, forced
sales require larger discounts than if the market were fully liquid. Second, the
house may also have become physically damaged during the foreclosure process
(Campbell, Giglio and Pathak, 2011).
Due to mutually benecial gains to avoiding foreclosure, lenders tend to
look for alternatives including modifying the original terms of the loan to forgive some portion of the debt. However, analysis of the PLS market has shown
several frictions in the structure of private mortgage securitization that prevented modications which forgave debt, even in cases where debt forgiveness
was mutually benecial for both borrower and investor. First, mortgages held
in securitization pools are governed by a contract known as a pooling and servicing agreement (PSA). These contracts dene the roles and responsibilities
of all parties to the securitization, such as the transfers of the loans into the
trust, management of the trust, issuance of securities to investors, servicing of
the loans, and permissible actions that can be taken once a loan is in default.
However, research has shown that roughly 40% of securitized mortgages are
governed by PSA's with some clause that restricts servicer modication ability
(Gelpern and Levitin, 2009).
Second, academic research and government reports have also shown that
there is a principal-agent problem between servicers and investors that impedes
restructuring even when it is in the investors' interest. A servicer's compensation is not aligned with the investors' interest in maximizing the net present
value of the loan.

Instead, a servicer's choice of modication or foreclosure,

and type of modication, is based on the incentives in their own compensation
structure. Servicers receive three main types of income: a xed-rate fee based
on the unpaid principal balance of a loan; oat income from the period in which
the servicer receives monthly payments but has not remitted them to the trust;
and ancillary fees. The main types of ancillary fees include delinquency fees and
reimbursement for costs associated with foreclosure, such as property maintenance fees, title search fees, process serving fees, appraisal fees, other legal fees,
or any of a number of other fees.

There is no eective oversight of the rea-

sonableness of these fees, and servicers are able to be reimbursed for these fees
out of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale prior to any revenue being given to
investors (Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009).
This misalignment of incentives creates two related problems which prevent
ecient restructuring.

First, these fees can be quite lucrative and create an

incentive to foreclose, even when it is in the investors' best interest to modify,
because modication is costly. Modication is costly for three reasons. First,
modications require substantial labor costs such as re-underwriting the loan.
Second, if the modication reduces monthly payments through reducing the
unpaid principal balance, the servicer loses its xed rate fee. Third, servicers
must advance missed payments while the loan is delinquent. They can recoup
these advances in cases of foreclosure or if the loan becomes current, but not
in many types of modications. In contrast, the fees associated with managing
delinquency and foreclosure can be quite lucrative. For example, analysis of one
major servicer, Ocwen, showed that late fees and loan collection fees made up
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18% of its revenue in 2008 (Thompson, 2011). There can also be an incentive
to keep a borrower delinquent so that the servicer can receive revenue from
delinquency fees, until the cost of nancing advances outweighs the revenue
received from the fees. This has been described as keeping the borrower in a
default fee sweatbox (Levitin and Twomey, 2011). Essentially, the servicer's
choice between modication and foreclosure is a choice between limited xedprice income and a cost-plus contract arrangement with no oversight of either
the costs or the plus components, (COP, 2009). Even worse for the investor,
this cost-plus structure creates an incentive to foreclose in a more costly manner
than less, because servicer's compensation is positively related to costs and has
the senior claim on foreclosure sale revenue. Cost-plus compensation is typically
banned from government contracts due to these perverse incentives (Levitin and
Twomey, 2011; COP, 2009).
The second problem created by this compensation structure is that it provides incentives for servicers to choose types of modications that promote their
own interests, even if these modications have a higher re-default rate and hence
do not promote the investors' interests.

For example, reducing monthly pay-

ments through principal reduction has been shown to be the most eective
form of modication at preventing re-defaults, while modications which increase debt have a much higher re-default rate (Haughwout, Okah and Tracy,
2016; Goodman et al., 2012). However, servicers are disincentivized to perform
principal reduction because it reduces the amount of revenue they receive from
their xed-rate fee which is assessed on the unpaid principal balance. Instead,
they receive more compensation from this fee when they perform modications
which increase the unpaid principal balance.

Providing modications with a

higher re-default rate can also potentially be a source of prot for servicers, because they can receive the lucrative foreclosure fees described above (Thompson,
2011; COP, 2009).
An obvious question is what is preventing market competition from correcting the principal-agent problem by creating reputational incentives for good
servicers who can meet the needs of investors? Reputation was not able to provide sucient incentives for good servicers because, after the collapse of the
PLS market in 2009, there was simply very little prospect for servicing large
pools of subprime loans in the future (Cordell et al., 2008). Additionally, investors lacked the ability to compel servicers to provide ecient loss mitigation
due to information and collective action problems.

Investors faced two main

collective action problems in changing this structure.

First, many PSAs had

collective action clauses requiring a super majority of investors to amend any
contractual terms.

However, there were typically large numbers of geograph-

ically dispersed investors party to most of the major securitizations.

Second,

investors sometimes had conicting interest regarding type of loan modication, because they received income based on dierent parts of the cash ow,
such as principal and interest payments. Therefore a loan modication which
maximized the net present value of the mortgage might still adversely aect
an individual investor.

Even if investors could overcome these collective ac-

tion problems, they also lacked the necessary data to evaluate loss mitigation
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practices of servicers, such as loan-level data concerning the re-underwriting of
modications. Moreover, investors typically lacked detailed information on the
amount of fees being assessed by servicers. These collective action and information problems eectively undermined investors' ability to perform meaningful
oversight of servicers (Levitin and Twomey, 2011).
The friction due to the principal-agent problem is also relevant for the literature on consumer nancial protection (Campbell et al., 2011), because capitalization of fees has been associated with signicant violations.

In addition

to being described in academic and government reports, CFPB enforcement actions also provide important case-studies of servicer misconduct. For example,
in 2013 the CFPB and Attorneys General from 49 states and the District of
Columbia settled a complaint with Ocwen Financial Corporation, one of the
largest non-bank mortgage servicers in the country.

This settlement required

Ocwen to pay $2 billion of relief to homeowners for taking, advantage of borrowers at every step of the process.

Among other improper actions, Ocwen

charged unauthorized fees for default related services, deceived consumers
about foreclosure alternatives and improperly denied loan modications, and
engaged in illegal foreclosure practices.

3 These practices seem to be persistent

as well, because the CFPB sued Ocwen again more recently in April 2017 for,
failing borrowers at every stage of the mortgage servicing process.

4

Recent empirical research has also conrmed that the cumulative eect of
the frictions associated with private mortgage securitization was to cause an ineciently low level of modications. For example, the dierence in the amount
of modications between securitized loans and loans held in bank portfolios
suggest that modications for securitized loans are ineciently low. Recent estimates have shown the mortgages held in private securitization pools were less
likely to be modied than loans held in banks portfolios, by 26%-36% (Agarwal
et al., 2011) or 13%-32% (Piskorski, Seru and Vig, 2010). Additionally, Maturana (2017) found that an additional modication for the marginal loan reduced
losses by 40% relative to the average loss. This suggests that the marginal benets to modication were substantially higher than the marginal costs, which
implies that the level of modications was ineciently low.
The literature on friction has also argued that perverse incentives in servicers'
compensation helps to explain why the public intervention to promote more
modications through the Home Aordable Modication Program (HAMP) fell
short of its stated goals. The HAMP program sought to induce more voluntary
modications through providing incentive payments to servicers for performing
more modications.

However, when compared to the possible fee compensa-

tion from foreclosing, these incentives were too small to promote an ecient

3A

description
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the
consent
order
can
be
found
at:
https://www.consumernance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-state-authorities-order-ocwento-provide-2-billion-in-relief-to-homeowners-for-servicing-wrongs/. Accessed September 1,
2017.
4A
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https://www.consumernance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-ocwen-failing-borrowersthroughout-mortgage-servicing-process/. Accessed September 1, 2017.
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level of modications (Levitin and Twomey, 2011). The initial HAMP program
was created in 2008 and designed to provide roughly 3-4 million modications.
However, ve years into the Great Recession, it had only provided 860,000 permanent modications (Mian and Su, 2014). In addition to the principal-agent
problem, another reason for the failure of HAMP is that many servicers simply
lacked the capacity to handle the necessary volume of modications (Agarwal
et al., 2017).
The ndings from my decomposition analysis extends the previous literature by providing systematic evidence consistent with the hypothesis that the
increase in capitalization is due to capitalization of fees, rather than missed
interest payments. Existing research contains detailed descriptions of the conict of interest in servicer compensation that incentivized capitalization of fees
(Levitin and Twomey, 2011; Thompson, 2011; COP, 2009), and government
enforcement actions provide case-studies of misconduct at individual servicers
such as Ocwen.

However, to date no study has systematically analyzed how

widespread this problem was throughout the entire market. I ll this gap by decomposing the increase in capitalization using a comprehensive loan-level panel
data set containing 30% - 40% of the PLS market, depending on year. My ndings conrm this prior research with systematic evidence, suggesting that this
problem was widespread, and grew worse through time.
The nding that capitalization is driven by fees is also relevant to the interpretation of redistribution inherent in modications. To the extent that the
increase in debt represents the imposition of fees by servicers due to cost-plus
compensation, the increase in debt can be unambiguously interpreted as an increase in total borrower debt obligations. This is relevant because some have
interpreted capitalization of missed interest payments alone as not increasing
total borrower obligations (COP, 2010). The results of my decomposition analysis will show that a substantial portion of the increase in debt is consistent
with increases in fees, but not consistent with increases in missed interest payments. Therefore, a large portion of the capitalization in the PLS market can
unambiguously be interpreted as an increase in total borrower obligations.

3

Data Description

The sample of loans used in this study comes from the Columbia Collateral
File (CCF), which is the same data set used in White (2008).

The CCF is

a large loan-level panel data set that includes all loans used as collateral for
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private label RMBS for which Wells Fargo is a trustee.

The full data set

contains monthly observations for 139 variables such as loan characteristics and
performance. The data begin in December 2006, which makes 2007 the rst year
for which complete data are available. The number of loans and outstanding
balance peaked in December 2007, with 4.2 million loans.

However, by 2014

the number of loans in the data set had fallen to roughly 1.44 million. This is
primarily due to the 1.9 million completed foreclosures which occurred.

5 This

data set is publicly available from www.ctslink.com.
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The CCF provides several variables measuring modications including type
of forgiveness or amount of capitalization. The CCF added variables to measure
types of debt forgiveness or capitalization in November of 2008, which makes
2009 the rst year for which we have complete data on redistribution in modications.

Types of debt forgiveness measured include principal forgiveness,

interest forgiveness, and expense forgiveness. Total capitalized amount is the
only variable which records the increase of debt. Capitalization in modications
occurs when missed interest payments or fees are added back to the outstanding
balance of the loan. Unfortunately, the data set does not provide separate measures of capitalization due to missed interest payments or fees. The data also
do not include whether the modication occurred through the HAMP program.
However, servicers which sign up for the HAMP program are required to use the
HAMP template for all modications that meet HAMP requirements. Many of
the servicers in this data set participated in HAMP, so it is likely that many of
the modications in the CCF data are HAMP modications (COP, 2010).
The variable used in this study to measure loss from foreclosures is titled
loss on liquidated property. This variable measures the dollar value of losses
to the investors due to having to sell the home for a price below the amount
of debt owed on the loan. This variable measures any losses due to the sale of
the home, which includes broader home forfeiture actions such as short sales or
deeds-in-lieu, in addition to foreclosures. Foreclosures, short sales, and deeds-inlieu are the three most common types of home forfeiture actions. These actions
occur when a borrower is delinquent, but the value of the home is less than
the amount owed on the loan, so that the borrower cannot sell the home.

A

foreclosure occurs when the lender forces the sale of the home to repay the value
of the debt. A short sales occurs when the borrower nds a purchaser for the
home at an amount below what is owed on the loan, and then gets the lender
to consent to the sale. A deed-in-lieu of foreclosure occurs when the delinquent
borrower signs over the deed to the lender to prevent foreclosure from occurring.
The lender will then need to sell the home. Borrowers tend to prefer short-sales
or deeds-in-lieu because they are less damaging to a borrower's credit score than
foreclosure. The results for losses from foreclosure reported in the next section
are actually losses due to home forfeiture actions more broadly dened.

It is

satisfactory to combine these broader home forfeiture actions under the label
of foreclosure for the purposes of comparing losses due to home forfeiture with
debt forgiveness in modications.
The main risk measures in the data set are the FICO credit score and the
loan-to-value (LTV) ratio. The FICO credit score is an index of creditworthiness
that measures the borrower's chance of default over the next two years, with a
higher credit score indicating a less risky borrower. The score does not provide
an absolute measure of chance of default. Instead, the score provides a ranking of
a borrower's creditworthiness relative to other borrowers. The score is based on
the amount of debt a borrower currently owes, the borrower's payment history,
types of credit in use, the length of credit history, and new credit. However, the
exact formula used to calculate how each of these categories aects a credit score
is proprietary, and thus not publicly available. Additionally, the weight given to
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each of these categories in calculating the credit score diers for each individual
based on their particular credit history (Bhardwaj and Sengupta, 2015).
FICO scores range between 300-850, and are used to classify borrowers as
subprime, alt-A, and prime. Based on the denition used in the OCC Mortgage
Metrics report, subprime credit scores are those with FICO scores less than
620, alt-A are between 620 and 660, and prime are greater than 660.

These

categories are one factor that is used to determine what type of loan a borrower
can receive, the amount of the loan, and the interest rate of the loan. Typically,
prime borrowers qualify for the lowest interest rates and largest loans.
The LTV ratio is the ratio of the original loan balance to the appraisal
value of the home. The LTV ratio measures the amount of equity in a home
which serves as a cushion to absorb house price declines. For example, a loan
with an LTV of 80 can withstand a price decline of 20% of the value of the
home before the borrower would have negative equity. If the home was sold in
foreclosure after the borrowers positive equity was exhausted, the lender would
typically take the remaining loss. Traditionally, LTV ratios of 80% or below are
considered lower risk mortgages.
The growth of the outstanding balance of loans in the CCF broadly mirrors
that of the PLS market. Figure 1 shows the nominal yearly outstanding balance
of the PLS market and the CCF from 2002-2014. The private label market grew
rapidly from 2002 to 2007, tripling in value. After peaking at an outstanding
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balance of $2.7 trillion in 2007, the market experienced severe losses and declined
rapidly. As of 2014, the outstanding balance of the PLS market was $957 billion,
which was roughly equal to the 2002 outstanding balance. The volumes of loans
in the CCF with origination dates prior to 2005 does not appear to be a large
share of the total market. However, this is likely because many loans securitized
prior to 2005 were renanced.

Following 2005, the CCF market share grew

rapidly and accounted for just under 40% of the PLS market in 2007, with an
outstanding balance of $1.05 trillion. The outstanding balance in the CCF then
declined rapidly throughout the sample period, ending 2014 with roughly $350
billion outstanding (SIFMA, 2015).
The CCF data appear to be broadly representative of the entire market.
In general, the data account for a substantial portion of the entire market and
mirrors the growth of the market. Also, the summary statistics of observable
risk measures are similar to those reported in Grin and Maturana (2016) and
Piskorski, Seru and Witkin (2015), who use data based on this market. Because
it appears representative of the entire market, the full CCF data set from 20082014 is used to produce calculations for the entire market, based on the yearly

6 Additionally, a restricted sample of loans from the

market share of the CCF.

CCF is used to analyze average redistribution in modications and losses from
foreclosure. Following common practice in the literature which analyzes the PLS
market, the sample of loans from this data set is restricted to all mortgages that
are 1st lien, owner occupied, originated between 2002-2008, with loan-to-value
ratios between 70 and 100, FICO credit scores between 300 and 850, balances
greater than $30,000, and for which there is complete data.
These restrictions help to ensure that we are analyzing a consistent group of
loans, prevent data errors, and to ensure that the analysis in this paper is comparable with the analysis of other papers in the literature. Loans are limited
to those that are 1st lien loans because these are qualitatively dierent from
junior liens.

If a home is sold in foreclosure, junior liens are only paid back

once the rst lien is paid in full. Due to this dierence in priority, comparing
average modication and foreclosure experiences across these groups would be
less informative than focusing on 1st liens exclusively. The sample is limited to
owner-occupied loans because the public intervention to encourage more modications was designed to prevent the forfeiture of a family's primary residence,
rather than the loss of an investment property. The sample is restricted to loans
originated from 2002-2008 because these homes were at the focal point of the
foreclosure crisis.

Loans are limited to LTV ratios from 70 - 100 to compare

loans with similar amounts of pre-crisis equity. The sample is limited to FICO
credit scores between 300 and 850, because this is the range of credit scores
produced by FICO. Loans outside of this range represent some type of data
error.

Similarly, loans are restricted to those above $30,000, because Grin

6I

use 2008-2014 for the calculations in this table, rather than the full 2006-2014, because
November 2008 is the rst month in which redistribution information is recorded for modications. Therefore, comparing total losses to foreclosure from 2006-2014 with total debt
added in modications from 2008-2014 would overstate the magnitude of losses to foreclosure
relative to modications.
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and Maturana (2016) showed that loans below this range contained a greater
proportion of data errors.
The pooled sample is built by merging the data from the month of December
to provide a retrospective snap shot of the year. After these restrictions, the full
2006-2014 pooled sample includes 10 million loan-year observations. The sample
also includes roughly 900,000 of the 1.9 million unique foreclosures, and 515,000
of the 900,000 modications. A large portion of foreclosures and modications
are typically dropped from the sample during the year in which they occur, so
these dropped observations are merged back into the December observations.

Table 1: Sample Description

Panel A: Loan Information (mean)
All

Current

Delinquent

Foreclosed

Modied

276,663

282,970

267,957

272,698

259,552

Loan-to-Value

82.12

81.72

82.66

82.86

82.98

FICO Score

661.9

677

640.9

645.4

627.6

10,057,406

5,854,415

4,103,753

884,741

513,954

Original Balance ($)

N

Panel B: Distribution of Risk Measures, Loan Type, and Purpose (%)
All

Current

Delinquent

Foreclosed

Modied

FICO Score
Sub Prime

27.4

20.6

36.9

34.3

45.9

Alt-A

21.6

19.5

24.5

25.0

25.1

Prime

51.0

60.0

38.6

41.0

29.0

62.7

Loan-to-Value
LTV <= 80

71.0

73.9

67.2

67.1

80 < LTV <= 95

19.4

17.1

22.6

22.2

26.6

95 <= LTV

9.6

9.0

10.3

10.7

10.7

Loan Type
Fixed Rate

35.7

38.2

32.1

31.1

49.7

Adjustable Rate

62.8

60.6

66.1

66.1

44.9

Purchase

47.5

48.1

46.8

48.6

40.2

Renace

13.2

14.3

11.7

11.0

11.0

Cash-out Renance

37.5

35.9

39.6

37.6

46.2

Loan Purpose

Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for all loans, current loans, delinquent loans, foreclosed loans, and modied loans. The basic pattern is that loans
across these groups tended to be quite similar. As expected, current loans have
slightly better risk measures than delinquent loans.

Somewhat unexpectedly,

modied loans tended to have slightly worse risk measures than other groups.
However, modied loan's risk measures were still relatively close to those of the
other groups.
There were roughly 1.5 million unique loans in the full sample in 2006 and
2007. For the pooled sample, this yields 10,000,000 loan-year observations with
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Figure 2:

Total Balances for Current, Delinquent, Foreclosed, and Modied
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an average original balance of $275,000. Throughout the course of 2006-2014,
roughly 40% of loans were delinquent at least once, for a total of 4.3 million
delinquent loan-year observations. Delinquent observations in this sample are
counted as any loan that is delinquent at least once in the preceding year.
During the full 2006-2014 period, the sample contains roughly 900,000 unique
foreclosures, and 515,000 unique modications. However, about 140,000 of these
modications eventually ended up in foreclosure.
Panel B shows the distribution of risk measures, types of loans, and purpose
of loans across these groups. As could be expected, risk measures were better
for current loans than delinquent loans. Current loans had a much higher proportion of prime credit scores, while modied loans had the largest proportion
of subprime credit scores. Current loans also had lower LTVs than delinquent
loans. Current loans and delinquent loans tended to be more similar in terms of
loan types and purposes. The exception is modied loans, which had a largest
proportions of xed rate mortgages and cash-out renances.
Figure 2 provides data on the performance of loans in the sample from 2006-

7 The gure shows the total balances of loans that are current, delinquent,

2014.

7 The full 2006-2014 period is shown here, rather than the 2008-2014 period which forms
the basis for the bulk of the analysis in the next section, to allow the reader to see the pre-crisis
period of 2006.
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foreclosed, and modied. The height of the delinquent balance shows the portion
of the total balance that is delinquent. Additionally, height of the delinquent
balance is subdivided into the areas that are accounted for by the total balance
of foreclosed, modied, and delinquent loans that are neither foreclosed or modied. The basic pattern in this gure is that delinquencies were quite severe,
and tended to result in more foreclosures than modications.
The total balance of loans in the sample peaked in 2007 at nearly $450 billion, before rapidly declining due to poor performance.

From 2009-2011, the

delinquent balance was roughly the same or slightly greater than the current
balance. The delinquent balance in these years ranged between $140-$155 billion. The delinquent balance remained between 85%-65% of the current balance
in the remaining years of the sample. Also, in all years the foreclosed balance
was larger than the modied balance. The modied balance peaked at $31 billion in 2010, which was 86% of the foreclosed balance. The modied balance
ranged between 50%-60% percent of the foreclosed balance in 2008, 2009, 2011,
and 2014, but was only 36% of the foreclosed balance from 2012-2013. In addition, typically between 40%-60% of delinquent loans were neither modied nor
foreclosed.

4

Main Results

4.1 Loan Modications and the Weakening of Household
Balance Sheets from 2008-2014
Modications of delinquent mortgages in the PLS market resulted in a cumulative net increase to borrowers' unpaid principal balances of $20 billion dollars

8 During this period, the total amount capitalized in modica-

from 2008-2014.

tions in this market was $34 billion, which was over twice as much as the total
amount forgiven of $14.2 billion. This can be seen in panel A of Table 2, which
presents the total change in debt due to modications for the restricted sample,
full CCF data set, and the entire PLS market. The results from the full CCF
are projected to the level of the entire PLS market based on the CCF's yearly
market share. Panel B in Table 2 also presents the cumulative total number of
modications during this period, as well as type of redistribution in modication. Consistent with the ndings for aggregate change in debt, we see that the
number of modications with capitalization in the PLS market was over 4 times
larger than the number of modications with forgiveness. Overall, only 5% of
total modications during this period resulted in a net reduction of debt.
Capitalization in loan modications also began to increase during the later
years of the sample, with capitalization in 2014 larger than any other year,
except for the peak crisis year of 2010. This can be seen in Figure 3, which shows
the net change in debt per year in the restricted sample. This nding extends

8 As discussed in the data description section, November 2008 is the rst month for which
the CCF recorded dierent measures of redistribution in modications. This makes 2009 the
rst year for which we have complete data for redistribution in modications.
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Table 2: Total Capitalization and Forgiveness in Modications from 2008-2014

Panel A: Total Change in Debt from Modications (Billions $)
Sample

CCF

PLS Market

Capitalization

7.1

11.4

34.0

Forgiveness

-3.0

-4.7

-14.2

Principal

2.1

3.33

9.92

Interest

.55

.89

2.66

Expense

.32

.52

1.58

Redistribution Modications

Net

Type of Forgiveness

4.1

6.7

19.8

Panel B: Total Number of Modications
Sample

CCF

PLS Market

All Modications

513,954

908,486

2,590,405

Redistribution Modications

328,437

565,022

1,644,977

Capitalization

304,448

517,552

1,506,732

Forgiveness

67,673

123,099

357,712

Type of Redistribution
Type of Forgiveness
Principal

27,630

52,817

155,164

Interest

58,526

104,897

304,437

Expense

25,778

46,870

137,446
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the existing literature, because it shows that the increase in debt identied
in COP (2010) and White (2008) grew larger through time.

The peak year

for total increase in debt was 2010, where roughly $1.3 billion was added to
borrowers' unpaid principal balances.

Over the course of the next two years,

the total amount of debt added by modications decreased. The lowest total
amount of debt added occurred in 2012, when debt was only increased by $288
million. However, following 2012 the total amount of debt added grew each year.
In the nal year of the restricted sample, modications added $834 million to
household debt.
Consistent with the ndings in Figure 3, the average net increase in debt
per modication consistently grew from 2008-2014, and increased sharply in the
nal two years of the sample.

This can be seen in Panels A and B in Table

3, which show the mean change in debt per modication, in dollars and as a
percentage of the original balance, for the restricted sample. The average net
increase in debt per modication was 3.3 percent of the original loan balance
in 2009, which is the rst year with complete data on redistribution in loan
modications. The increase in debt grew to roughly 4.5%-5.5% of the relative
balance over the next three years, but then more than doubled to 11.3% by
in 2014. Average capitalization per loan roughly tripled throughout the sample
period, from $12,000 in 2008 to $36,000 in 2014. This increase was from roughly
5.5% to 15% of the current loan balance. This nding also extends the earlier
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research of COP (2010) and White (2008) by showing that the problems they
identied grew worse through time.

Consistent with COP (2010) and White

(2008), only 5% of total modications in my sample reduced debt, and 2010
modications increased debt by roughly 5%. However, by the nal year of the
sample, the average net increase in borrower debt doubled to 11.3%.

Table 3: Total Number of Modications and Mean Change in Debt

Panel A: Total Number of Modications

All Mods
Redistribution Mods

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

83,061

104,933

110,581

74,878

51,261

46,873

35,569

9,446

57,893

82,891

59,104

44,653

41,966

32,484

Type of Redistribution
Capitalization

8,443

54,543

80,320

53,130

38,753

38,169

31,090

Forgiveness

2,428

12,943

10,975

14,565

13,252

8,790

4,720

Type of Forgiveness
Principal

902

3,366

2,852

6,197

7,113

5,219

1,981

Interest

2,036

11,405

9,691

13,129

11,511

6,772

3,982

Expense

1,132

3,335

2,578

6,448

6,703

3,856

1,726

2012

2013

2014

Panel B: Mean Change in Debt ($)
2008

2009

Capitalization

12,219

13,268

19,743

23,386

28,038

33,396

36,232

Forgiveness

24,758

20,832

23,849

39,296

60,264

79,934

61,921

Redistribution Modications

Net

2010

2011

-4,558

-7,843

-15,973

-11,339

-6,449

-13,632

-25,680

Principal

46,182

55,257

66,917

71,332

80,412

95,142

84,191

Interest

6,729

5,917

5,454

6,578

12,079

17,109

17,542

Expense

4,201

4,842

6,997

6,813

13,071

23,395

32,231

2011

2012

2013

2014
14.6

Type of Forgiveness

Panel C: Mean Change in Debt (%)
2008

2009

2010

Redistribution Modications
Capitalization
Forgiveness

Net

5.6

5.7

7.1

9.2

13.0

14.7

13.6

9.0

10.1

16.4

21.9

25.2

18.3

-1.5

-3.3

-5.6

-4.6

-5.1

-8.1

-11.3

Principal

26.3

25.1

31.4

35.1

35.5

37.1

32.0

Interest

3.5

2.8

2.5

4.1

7.0

8.2

7.1

Expense

2.5

2.6

4.0

5.1

8.4

11.7

14.1

Type of Forgiveness

Average forgiveness per loan also grew throughout the sample period, peaking in 2013 at close to $80,000 or 25% of the loan balance. Average forgiveness
per loan tended to be far larger than average capitalization, and principal forgiveness was much more generous than any other form of forgiveness. Principal
forgiveness was over 30% of the current loan balance from 2010-2014, and peaked
at almost $100,000 in 2013. However, as can be seen in Panel C of Table 3, far
fewer loans received forgiveness. In 2009 the ratio of modications with capitalization to those with forgiveness was slightly higher than 4:1. However, this
increased to over 7:1 in 2010, which was the year with the greatest increase in
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The ratio then fell to approximately 3:1 for the next two years, before

increasing sharply in 2013 and 2014. In 2014 the ratio grew to almost 7:1, resulting in a larger net increase in debt in 2014 than in any other year, except
the peak year of 2010.
The yearly changes in the ratio of modications with capitalization to those
with forgiveness also helps to show that change in total debt is driven more
by variation in forgiveness than capitalization. This can be seen in Figure 4,
which presents total forgiveness and capitalization per year in the restricted
sample. Total amounts capitalized peaked at over $1.5 billion in 2010, and then
remained fairly consistent at slightly over $1 billion per year for the remainder of
the sample period. In contrast, total forgiveness was quite low until 2011, when
it reached roughly $500 million.

Total forgiveness peaked in 2012 at almost

$800 million, before returning to pre-2011 levels in 2014.

The total amount

of capitalization was relatively constant from 2011-2014, so variation in total
net change in debt was driven largely by the increase and decrease in total
forgiveness. A probable explanation for this pattern is that 2012 was the nal
year of the primary portion of the HAMP program, and so total forgiveness
decreased after the program expired.
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4.2 Was the Increase in Capitalization Driven by Missed
Interest Payments or Fees?
4.2.1 Missed Interest Payments, Delinquencies, and Capitalization
Figure 5 helps to show why missed interest payments lack explanatory power
for the increase in capitalization. This gure plots the average amount of capitalization and missed interest per year, as well as the dierence between capitalization and missed interest payments, which is labeled the capitalization gap.
The primary nding in this gure is that, as capitalization was increasing, the
average amount of missed interest payments per modication

declined

due to

falling interest rates. Therefore, the increase in capitalization could not be due
to increases in missed interest payments because missed interest was decreasing.
Over the full period for my sample, total missed interest payments only
account for roughly 45% of total capitalization, leaving a total capitalization
gap of 55%.

However, as can be seen in Figure 6, missed interest payments

accounted for progressively less of total capitalization in each year.

In 2009

missed interest payments accounted for 97% of total capitalization in my sample,
before declining sharply to 50% in 2010, and then to 25% in 2012. By the nal
year of the sample, missed interest payments only accounted for 17% of total
capitalization.
A further reason missed payments lack explanatory power can also be seen in
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Figure 7, which shows the average number of months delinquent per modication
and capitalization per delinquency.

The basic trend here is that the average

number of months delinquent per modication only varied by four-tenths of one
month delinquent from 2010 - 2014, ranging from 8.7 - 9.1 months delinquent per
modication.

However, while delinquencies per modication stayed relatively

constant, capitalization increased during this period, so that the amount of
capitalization per delinquency increased. Capitalization per delinquency in 2010
was roughly $1,700, but doubled to $3,500 by 2014. Simply put, the increase in
capitalization from 2010-2014 could not have been driven by an increase in the
number of months delinquent per modication because delinquencies remained
constant during this period.

4.2.2 Decomposition Analysis
In this section, I formally conrm the ndings presented visually in Figures 5
through 7 by using a decomposition analysis to estimate the ability of missed
interest payments, or other observables, to explain the increase in capitalization.

Missed interest payments are observed in my data, while fees assessed

by servicers are not. This allows me to use a Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to
estimate the portion of the increase in capitalization observed for the later years
that can be explained by missed interest payments or other observable characteristics, and what portion cannot be explained by observables, and hence is
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consistent with capitalization of fees. My analysis takes advantage of the fact
that the primary portion of the HAMP program expired in 2012 to create a

9 For all servicers enrolled, which was roughly 90%

counter-factual benchmark.

of servicers of privately securitized mortgages, the HAMP program required
the capitalization of missed interest payments, but forbade the capitalization
of delinquency or other fees (COP, 2010). Therefore, modications which occurred before 2012 provide a benchmark for capitalization due to missed interest
payments, but without capitalization of fees.
It is important to note the research design for my decomposition is conservative for two reasons. The decomposition should therefore be seen as a diagnostic
for estimating the explanatory power of missed interest payments, rather than
an estimate of a causal eect. First, my identifying assumption concerning the
prohibition of fees by the HAMP program is likely violated in ways that would
negatively bias the estimate of the increase in capitalization due to fees after
2012. For example, while the HAMP program prohibited the capitalization of
late fees, it did not prohibit the capitalization of all fees. The HAMP program
allowed servicers to capitalize advances made to third parties. However, many
of the third parties were in fact aliated with the servicer, and servicers of-

9 To be sure, HAMP was extended beyond 2012. However, HAMP modications accounted
for a much smaller portion of total modications in the PLS market after 2012. For reference,
see the quarterly OCC Mortgage Metrics reports from 2013-2014.
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ten received a percentage of the advances made to these aliates (Thompson,

10 To the extent that these fees were capitalized in pre-2012 modications,

2011).

we would expect the decomposition analysis to understate the true dierence in
capitalization between periods, and therefore overstate the contribution of the
explained component.

Additionally the HAMP program only covered 90% of

servicers. If the remaining 10% of servicers capitalized fees, this would underestimate the dierence in capitalization, hence overstating the contribution of the
explained component. Finally, while the primary portion of the HAMP program
expired in 2012, the HAMP program was actually extended until 2016, although
it covered a much smaller portion of the market. To the extent that it successfully prevented capitalization of fees post-2012, this would also understate the
true causal eect.
In addition to the conservative identifying assumption, the decomposition
analysis itself is also expected understate the true eect of fees on capitalization.

For example, using simulated data Elder, Goddeeris and Haider (2010)

show that the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition systematically overestimates the contribution of the explained component, and hence underestimates
the size of unexplained component. Taken together, the conservative research
design implies any null nding regarding the explanatory power of missed interest payments or other observables is stronger than it would be absent these
conservative assumptions.

However, the conservative assumptions also imply

that the decomposition should not be interpreted as a causal eect.
My decomposition estimates the dierence in capitalization between pre- and
post-2012 modications, and what portion of this dierence can be explained by
missed interest payments or other observables. To perform this analysis, I use a
panel model with ZIP code level xed eects separately for pre- and post-2012
modications. The decomposition analysis is then conducted with the reference
coecient estimated in the pooled sample, as suggested in Neumark (1988) and
Jann (2008). However, the results are also consistent when using either pre- or
post-2012 modications as reference group. The regression model is:

yiz = αz + β0 + ΛXiz + eiz ,
yiz is one of two outcomes for loan i in ZIP code z , αz is a ZIP code level
xed eect, and Xiz is a vector of controls The two outcome variables are the
where

amount of capitalization, and capitalization as a percent of the current balance.
The vector of controls includes the number of months delinquent per loan, total
missed interest payments per loan, the original balance, and sets of indicators
of for risk measures including FICO, LTV, loan purpose/type, loan type, and
origination year. These controls allow me to use the power of regression as a
matching estimator to ensure that I am comparing modications that are similar
in terms of delinquencies, size, and observable risk measures. Additionally, the
ne-grained geographical detail of the data allows me to use ZIP code level xed
eects to control for local economic conditions. To ease estimation, ZIP code

10 This practice was one practice described in the 2013 Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau complaint against Ocwen, the largest servicer of privately securitized mortgages.
Full text of complaint available from: http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_
consent-order_ocwen.pdf Accessed June 15th, 2016.
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Table 4: Decomposition Results

Capitalization ($)
Dierence Percentage
Total Dierence

7982.9

∗∗∗

100%

(62.76)

Explained

∗∗∗

2519.4

∗∗

-37.21

31.6%

1120.2

∗∗∗

-0.5%

∗∗∗

155.2

14%

∗∗∗

1281.2

1.9%

∗∗∗

5463.5

16%

∗∗∗

-155.5

68.5%

∗∗∗

259.2

-2.0%

∗∗∗

-62.32

3.3

∗∗∗

191.8

-.8%

N
t

∗

5230.2

∗∗∗

15.2%

0.0%

∗∗∗

.1%

∗∗∗

0.1%

3.3%

2.9%

∗∗∗

75.52%

0.09%

∗∗∗

2.3%

∗∗∗

0.2%

5.2%

∗∗∗

-0.1%

-1.22%

(-11.26)
2.4%

(12.28)
Constant

∗∗∗

0.6%

(32.45)

(-6.64)
Balance

4.8%

(14.59)

(25.95)
Risk Measures

∗∗∗

(63.38)

(-9.31)
Delinquency

0.2%

(17.48)

(56.53)
Missed Interest

24.3%

(7.12)

(22.57)

Unexplained

∗∗∗

(43.72)

(12.58)
Balance

0.9%

(24.70)

(44.20)
Risk Measures

100%

(48.78)

(-2.63)
Delinquency

∗∗∗

3.84%

(71.86)

(36.10)
Missed Interest

Capitalization/Balance (%)
Dierence
Percentage

0.0%

∗∗∗

0.8%

(7.59)
65.5%

2.63%

∗∗∗

(52.00)

(59.37)

420712

420712

statistics in parentheses
p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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68.5%

level xed eects and origination year xed eects are partialed out prior to
estimation.
The results are reported in Table 4. The total dierence in capitalization
between the two time periods is just under $8,000, or 4% of the current loan
balance. Only between one-third and one-quarter of this variation can be explained by observables. Missed interest payments alone have almost no explanatory power, and can explain only 5% of the dierence at most. The number of
months delinquent has the highest consistent explanatory power, but can still
only explain 15% of the dierence.

The original balance explains 16% of the

dierence in capitalization measured in dollars. However, when the dierence
in capitalization is normalized as a share of the loan balance, the size of the
original balance loses almost all explanatory power.

Risk measures including

the LTV or FICO also have almost no explanatory power.

Overall, the null

nding regarding the explanatory power of observables is not consistent with
the hypothesis that the increase in capitalization observed in later years in my
sample is driven by missed interest payments.

4.2.3 Robustness and Limitations of Decomposition
The results from the decomposition rule out missed interest payments as the
source of capitalization, and are consistent with the hypothesis that capitalization is driven by fees.

However, the decomposition analysis alone cannot

tell us what portion of the unexplained component is consistent with fees, and
what portion is consistent with dierences along unobservable dimensions. To
formally test for the eect of selection along unobservables on the unexplained
component, I use the test developed in Oster (2016).

This analysis tests for

the stability of coecients due to bias from selection on unobservables by comparing co-movements of coecients and
clude controls.

R2

in models which include and ex-

To the extent that selection along unobservables signicantly

biases estimated coecients, we would expect large changes in estimates across
specications.

To the extent that the results are not heavily inuenced by

unobservables, we would expect the estimated coecients to be stable across
specications. The test is performed by calculating a bias-adjusted estimate. If
the estimate remains non-zero after adjustment, then the estimate is stable to
selection along unobservables.
The bias adjusted coecients are dened as:

(R2

−R2

β = βlong − (βshort − βlong ) R2max−R2long
long

where

β

is the bias adjusted beta,

)

,

short

βlong

and

2
Rlong
βshort

are the coecient and

R2

2
from the regression which includes controls,
and Rshort are the coe2
2
cient and R from the regression without controls, and Rmax is the maximum
R2 . The test is performed under the conservative assumption of equal selection, which assumes unobservables are equally as important as observables. I
also use the recommended
this assumption for

2
Rmax

2
Rmax

of

2
.
1.3 ∗ Rlong

As described in Oster (2016),

is also conservative because only 90% of true results

based on simulated data remain non-zero when using this threshold. To per-
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form this test, my long regression is a panel model identical to the one in the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition above, with the exception that it includes an indicator variable for post-2012 modications. As described in Elder, Goddeeris
and Haider (2010), the coecient on this indicator will provide an unbiased
estimate of the unexplained increase in capitalization between the time periods.
The short regression corresponds to a model which only includes an indicator
variable for post-2012 modications, with delinquencies and the original balance
as covariates.

Table 5: Oster Test for Selection on Observables

Dierence in Capitalization ($)

R

2

Short

Long

Bias Adjusted

12,856.82

11,263.4

9,825.59

.1590

.1732

-

The results from the Oster (2016) test are reported in Table 5. The results
from this test are not consistent with a substantial eect of unobservables on the
unexplained component. The fully saturated model estimates an unexplained
dierence in capitalization of $11,263, compared with an estimate of $12,857 in
the short model, and a bias adjusted estimate of $9,825. This implies that even
using the conservative assumption that unobservables are equally as important
as observables, under which only 90% of true results remain non-zero, the eect
of unobservables is not substantial. A nal observation is that the estimate of the
unexplained dierence in capitalization from the long regression above is larger
than the estimate of the unexplained gap from the decomposition analysis. This
is consistent with the negative bias inherent in Oaxaca-Blinder decompositions
described in Elder, Goddeeris and Haider (2010), and provides further conrmation that my estimate of the explanatory power of missed interest payments
should be seen as an upper limit.
In total, the weight of evidence from the ndings of the decomposition analysis is not consistent with the hypothesis that missed interest payments, observable risk measures, and selection along unobservable dimensions are the primary
factors explaining the increase in capitalization post-2012. The decomposition
analysis shows that at most, missed interest payments and delinquencies can explain 15% of the increase in capitalization. Additionally, the large unexplained
component does not seem to be due to selection along unobservables, because
the bias-adjusted coecient produced by the Oster (2016) test is very similar to
non-adjusted coecient. This implies that even if we even if we make the conservative assumption that unobservables are equally as important as observables,
they have little ability to explain the increase in capitalization. Overall, the lack
of explanatory power of delinquencies and robustness of the unexplained component are consistent with capitalization being caused by fees, but not consistent
with capitalization driven by missed interest payments.
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4.2.4 Servicer Heterogeneity
A nal nding which is consistent with the increase in capitalization being driven
by fees, but not missed interest payments, is the substantial heterogeneity in
the capitalization gap between servicers. I calculate the average capitalization
gap for servicers by including a xed eect for the servicer in the panel model
similar to that used above for the decomposition analysis. The model is,

yiszt = αz + γs + δt + β0 + ΛXiszt + eiszt
yiszt is the capitalization gap, γs is the

where

servicer xed eect,

δt

is a xed

eect for year, and the rest of the variables are the same as those used for the
decomposition analysis.

This model is run during the post-2012 years of my

sample.
There are 46 servicers with modication activity in my sample during this
period, and the capitalization gap is not statistically dierent from zero for the
bottom half of the distribution. In contrast, the top quarter of the distribution
have statistically signicant coecients ranging from $47,500 to $56,157. The
high level of heterogeneity in the capitalization gap between servicers suggests
that the capitalization gap is likely more reective of dierences in characteristics among servicers, such as dierent propensities to capitalize fees, rather than
dierences in characteristics of modied loans, such as missed interest payments.
The ten servicers with the largest estimated coecients for the capitalization
gap, ranked highest to lowest, are: Saxon Mortgage Services, EMC Mortgage
Corporation, Chase Home Finance, Select Portfolio Servicing, Wells Fargo Bank,
Aurora Loan Services, Bank of America, JP Morgan Chase, Bayview Loan Servicing, and Ocwen Loan Servicing. The inclusion of Ocwen in the servicers with
the top 10 highest capitalization gaps is also signicant due to the documented
history of consumer protection violations described above. This suggests that
the ndings from the analysis of servicer heterogeneity are not spurious.

4.3 Losses from Foreclosures
Prior research has also argued that the combination of lack of modications
and loss severities of over 50% for foreclosures suggests that there was room to
increase debt forgiveness to mitigate losses (Cordell et al., 2008; White, 2008).
My data contains detailed information on losses from foreclosure, which allows
me to extend prior ndings to the level of the entire market.
From 2008-2014, there were just over 1.7 million foreclosures in the full CCF
data set, which is 89% larger than the 900,000 modications which occurred.
Projected to the level of the PLS market, the results imply that there were
slightly under 5 million foreclosures.

The biggest dierence between foreclo-

sures and modications occurred in 2012-2013, when there were over twice as
many foreclosures as modications. Compared with Corelogic's estimate of 5.7
million total foreclosures since 2008 this gure is unexpectedly high, even when
considering that the PLS market accounted for the lion's share of foreclosures

11 However, the variable which

during the Great Recession and weak recovery.

11 Corelogic

is a leading data provider which constructs widely used foreclosure reports.
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measures foreclosures in the CCF includes home forfeiture actions more broadly,
such as short sales or deeds-in-lieu, rather than just narrow foreclosures. This
factor can likely account for the dierence in estimates.
These foreclosures were also highly costly.

At an aggregate level during

this time period, there were roughly $120 billion in losses from foreclosure in
the sample, and $210 billion in the full CCF. This implies total losses from
foreclosure in the PLS market for this period reached almost $600 billion. This
level of loss is equal to 22% of the December 2007 peak outstanding balance
for the entire PLS market of $2.7 trillion. At the loan level, the average loss
from foreclosure ranged between roughly $110,000-$160,000, which was between
45%-62% of the original balance of the loan. In contrast, total forgiveness in
the PLS market during this period was only $14.2 billion.
Figure 8 compares total losses from foreclosure to the gross amount of for-

12 Aggregate losses from foreclosure in the re-

giveness in my restricted sample.

stricted sample were several orders of magnitude larger than the gross amount
of forgiveness. Indeed, losses from foreclosure per year in the sample are most
usefully measured in the tens of billions of dollars, while total forgiveness is more
usefully measured in the hundreds of millions. Losses from foreclosure peaked

The reports can be found here: http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/researchtrends/
national-foreclosure-report.aspx?WT.mc_id=prnw_160510_IrWNB#.V1dDVJErKhc.
12 Gross forgiveness is used here, instead of net, because modications resulted in net increase
in debt in each year.
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at close to $30 billion in 2009, and remained close to $20 billion for the next 3
years. In contrast, gross forgiveness was not larger than $800 million in any year.
At $30 billion, losses from foreclosure in the peak year were roughly ten times
larger than the combined total forgiveness for all years in the sample, which
was just under $3 billion. Consistent with prior ndings at the loan-level, the
large dierence between aggregate losses from foreclosure and debt forgiveness
in my data strongly suggests that there was ample room to increase forgiveness
to mitigate losses from foreclosure.

5

Conclusion

The ndings in this paper show that voluntary household debt restructuring
through loan modications in the PLS market increased borrower debt rather
than reduced it. From 2008-2014, loan modications added $20 billion to borrower unpaid principal balances. The net increase in debt per modication also
grew larger through time, roughly doubling from 2010-2014. This resulted in
the net increase in debt in 2014 being larger than in any other year of the sample, with the exception of the peak crisis year of 2010, despite having fewer
modications than other years. This increase in debt weakened household balance sheets, rather than strengthened them, contributing to the weakness of the
recovery.
I also nd that the increase in capitalization is consistent with increased
fees imposed by servicers, but not by increased numbers of missed interest
payments.

This nding is consistent with a principal-agent problem between

servicers and investors, based on perverse incentives in servicers' cost-plus compensation structure, that prevented ecient loss mitigation. Servicers were incentivized to foreclose rather than modify, or to provide unsustainable mortgages
that increased the borrower's debt. Loan modications which forgave borrowers by reducing debt, rather than punishing borrowers by increasing debt, likely
would have prevented a signicant portion of the 5 million foreclosures, which
resulted in $600 billion lost in the PLS market from 2008-2014.
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